{
"vendor": "Confluence",
"slug": "confluence",
"platform": "statuspage",
"status_url": "https://confluence.status.atlassian.com",
"last_checked": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"last_state": "ok",
"history_backfilled": true,
"first_watched": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"incidents": [
{
"body": "**SUMMARY**\n\n  \n\nOn August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state.\n\nAfter the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic.\n\n  \n\n**IMPACT**\n\n  \n\nThe overall impact was split into two discrete periods:\n\n  \n\n-   First, on\u00a027 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location.\n-   Second, on\u00a027 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions.\n\n  \n\n**ROOT CAUSE**\n\n  \n\nThe event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions.\n\nAfter the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again.\n\n  \n\n**REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\n  \n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn\u2019t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident:\n\n  \n\n-   **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service.\n-   **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn\u2019t occur again.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-27T05:16:07.474Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-27T04:22:09.127Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Issues accessing multiple Atlassian products in some regions",
"updated_at": "2026-09-07T02:53:20.231Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/tzwj4szpgdv9"
},
{
"body": "On 25th Aug 2026, some users may have experienced increased latency in email, mobile and slack notifications.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-25T14:33:57.169Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-25T08:42:48.035Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Notifications are delayed",
"updated_at": "2026-08-25T14:33:57.186Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/clg93z8tmk67"
},
{
"body": "On August 24, 2026, some JIRA, JSM, and Confluence users may have experienced performance degradation resulting in increased latency in email, mobile, and Slack notifications. The issue has been resolved for newly created notifications, and service is operating normally.\n\nThere may be older notifications that are being processed, and we expect them to be completed in next few hours.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-24T23:15:20.518Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-24T19:22:47.308Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Notifications",
"updated_at": "2026-08-24T23:15:20.535Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/4pygz54p4xst"
},
{
"body": "On 21st Aug 2026, between 04:26 UTC and 09:33 UTC, some users may have experienced issues with macros not rendering correctly in Confluence. \n\nThe issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-21T10:10:30.571Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-21T07:16:32.123Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Marketplace App Macros Not Rendering in Confluence",
"updated_at": "2026-08-21T10:10:30.588Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/5yp3z7zctnh9"
},
{
"body": "On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-12T22:13:28.260Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-12T20:11:34.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Confluence intermittent errors",
"updated_at": "2026-08-12T22:13:28.277Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/dynwn3553xy4"
},
{
"body": "## Summary\n\nOn Jul 6, 2026, between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC, Atlassian customers using cloud products in European (EU) regions experienced service disruptions affecting automation rule execution, user search, user picker, and related workflows. The incident began when a core identity service experienced database saturation in EU regions, increasing latency and error rates. While responders worked to restore capacity, an emergency mitigation was applied which blocked automation rules from accessing the identity endpoint. In parallel, the elevated identity latency contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service, degrading user search and user picker experiences across multiple products. Service was progressively restored after additional database read capacity was added, the emergency block was removed, and the user search service was manually scaled up.\n\n  \n\n## Impact\n\nThe incident affected customers across multiple Atlassian products in EU regions on Jul 6, 2026 between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC.\n\n-   **Core Identity service degradation:** elevated intermittent access denied rates were observed across products in EU regions.\n-   **Automation rule execution failures:** automation rules using the default user (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error.\n-   **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capability largely unavailable across products.\n\n  \n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe incident originated from a recent configuration change that reduced the cache lifetime for a core identity service. As EU workday traffic ramped up on July 6, 2026, a larger share of requests began reaching the backing database directly rather than being served from cache. The EU databases did not have sufficient regional capacity to absorb the increased load, and database CPU reached saturation, causing elevated intermittent access denied rates.\n\nAs part of the mitigation, an emergency block was applied to reduce load on the saturated identity service database and prioritize restoring the core identity service. This inadvertently prevented automation rules from passing their pre-execution permission checks, causing them to fail. The extended duration was primarily due to a secondary wave of automation rule failures caused by the processing limit throttling.\n\nIn parallel, the sustained degradation caused increased latency and intermittent failures across products that depend on these checks, and contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service. As a result, user search and user picker experiences became largely unavailable in EU regions until the permissions service recovered and the user search service was scaled up to restore capacity.\n\n  \n\n## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps\n\nWe know outages impact customers' productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n-   **Improve safeguards for high-impact emergency mitigations:** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review.\n-   **Strengthen identity infrastructure capacity and change safety:** Review regional database sizing and capacity headroom to reduce the risk of saturation during peak traffic periods, and refine the assessment process for configuration changes so downstream load impact is evaluated before production rollout.\n-   **Strengthen resilience against cascading failures from upstream degradation:** Audit backpressure handling, circuit breaker configuration, and autoscaling behavior in services, so that upstream degradation does not cause broader product impact across user search, user picker, and related experiences.\n-   **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Increase resilience of automation rules to reduce impact associated with incidents occurring in dependencies..\n\nWe recognize how critical reliable product workflows are for our customers, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-06T13:04:02.024Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-07-06T09:23:39.471Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Reliability issues with Jira and Confluence",
"updated_at": "2026-07-17T16:59:37.959Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/0bnn93w7trp6"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\n###   \n\nOn Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released \u2014 resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed.\n\n  \n\n### IMPACT\n\n###   \n\nThe overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces.\n\n  \n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\n###   \n\n1.  A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests.\n2.  Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer.\n3.  Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance.\n4.  Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result.\n\n  \n\n### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\n###   \n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production.\n\n  \n\nWe have already deployed the following fix:\n\n-   Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others.\n\nTo minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as:\n\n-   Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early.\n-   Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-16T15:56:40.613Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-16T13:46:41.998Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Confluence Cloud experiencing degraded viewing experience",
"updated_at": "2026-06-23T18:25:46.888Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/npzhdwdhc99g"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released \u2014 resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed.\n\n### IMPACT\n\nThe overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces.\n\n\u200c\n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\n\u200c\n\n1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests.\n2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer.\n3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance.\n4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result.\n\n\u200c\n\n### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\n\u200c\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production.\n\n\u200c\n\nWe have already deployed the following fix:\n\n* Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others.\n\nTo minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as:\n\n* Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early.\n* Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._\n\n\u200c\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-12T11:15:09.000Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-12T07:39:11.109Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Degraded performance with Confluence Cloud",
"updated_at": "2026-06-23T18:28:45.698Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/429x5sxfy4gj"
},
{
"body": "We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected.\n\nWe apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-10T06:31:04.920Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-10T06:14:02.096Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Delays in processing incoming Emails, Work Item notifications, and Scheduled Triggers in Marketplace Apps",
"updated_at": "2026-06-10T06:31:04.956Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/fg4d9cksd79n"
},
{
"body": "Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-27T07:48:49.273Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-27T06:03:31.792Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Users facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence",
"updated_at": "2026-05-27T07:48:49.302Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/1jdhk42rgq80"
},
{
"body": "Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-26T13:55:52.365Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-26T10:40:00.024Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Some macros failing to load in the Confluence Cloud editor",
"updated_at": "2026-05-26T13:55:52.403Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/qcp0sf1kjc3w"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n* **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards**\n\n    * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation.\n    * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region.\n    \n* **Reduce cross-region impact**\n\n    * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions.\n    \n\nWe recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-14T06:48:27.957Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-14T04:54:57.984Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Users experiencing issues accessing multiple Atlassian products",
"updated_at": "2026-05-19T19:04:43.345Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/v8nbtv6h3xwr"
},
{
"body": "All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise.\n\n### Summary\n\nOn May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution.\n\nThe incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nThe primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation.\n\n* Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline.\n* At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows.\n* At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00.\n* By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing\n\n**Automation**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected.\n\nAt 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed.\n\nBeginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded.\n\n**Jira and Jira Service Management**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident.\n\nJira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products.\n\nAt 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded.\n\n**Confluence**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation.\n\nThe underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed.\n\nBetween 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync.\n\n**Bitbucket and Pipelines**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident.\n\nAutomatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits.\n\nAt approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes.\n\n**Identity Services**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident.\n\nThe impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays.\n\nAfter the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services.\n\nWe are prioritizing improvements that will:\n\n* **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions.\n* **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-08T19:45:31.411Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-08T01:31:38.293Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple Atlassian services are experiencing issues",
"updated_at": "2026-05-20T06:55:50.889Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/b4c619vvm2pl"
},
{
"body": "On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-14T16:11:31.593Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-14T12:25:17.081Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted Rovo availability for Automation rules",
"updated_at": "2026-04-14T16:11:31.610Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/2ypzgvkf46j6"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\n* **Duration**: ~40 minutes \\(05:49\u201306:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\\)\n* **Affected regions**: US East and EU \\(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\\).\n* **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello.\n* **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThis incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention.\n\n**The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm.\n\n**The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery.\n\nThe incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute.\n\n**REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience:\n\n1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled.\n2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts.\n3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s reliability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-13T10:17:20.784Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-13T07:29:45.536Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Users experiencing issues with login across Atlassian products",
"updated_at": "2026-04-21T02:33:33.001Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/884syppcgv0c"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. \n\nA configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high\u2011density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers.\n\nThe root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period.\n\nImpacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context.\n\n**Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions.\n\n**Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue.\n\n**Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC.\n\n**Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC.\n\n**Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nAtlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. \n\nAn infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \\(CPU & Memory\\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products.\n\nThe change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst\u2011affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur:\n\n* **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types**  \n  Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly.\n* **Strengthen automated pre\u2011deploy validation for resource changes**  \n  Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads.\n* **Improve post\u2011deploy verification and alerting**  \n  Enhance monitoring and post\u2011deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod\u2011IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out.\n* **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits**  \n  Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts.\n* **Enhance recovery automation**  \n  Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-08T11:43:29.727Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-08T05:41:18.009Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple products impacted by search failures",
"updated_at": "2026-04-17T16:24:58.651Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/1kmsszd6095z"
},
{
"body": "On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-03-13T00:26:04.596Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-03-12T11:42:39.659Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Static macro rendering is failing in Confluence Cloud",
"updated_at": "2026-03-13T00:26:04.617Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/ylgpnwlnv9bb"
},
{
"body": "On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-03-10T00:59:03.202Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-03-10T00:15:49.969Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Automation events delayed for some customers in the APAC region",
"updated_at": "2026-03-10T00:59:03.219Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/s7szwxd5rqfq"
},
{
"body": "This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-20T12:26:08.268Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-20T04:14:19.453Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Cloud Products when selecting users or teams",
"updated_at": "2026-02-20T12:26:08.289Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/d2d12xvl1zkl"
},
{
"body": "On February 19 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central regions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-19T17:47:01.331Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-19T15:44:25.955Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted availability of Confluence Cloud in several regions",
"updated_at": "2026-02-19T17:47:01.348Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/rkc1nbjg025k"
},
{
"body": "We have implemented the fix and the group page in the Admin Hub is now functioning as expected.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-18T11:30:29.538Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-18T10:57:38.385Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Groups are not clickable from Groups Page in Atlassian Administration",
"updated_at": "2026-02-18T11:30:29.556Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/859zc5lrrqs9"
},
{
"body": "Team has identified the root cause and the issue has now been resolved, and the impacted services are operating normally. Team will continue to monitor the impacted services.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-03T10:50:35.599Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-03T10:19:54.340Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Confluence, Jira Mobile and Forge users may experience authentication issues",
"updated_at": "2026-02-03T10:50:35.613Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/452gy3xttr3j"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn Jan 08, 2026 between 14:54 UTC and 16:30 UTC, Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud product\\(s\\) experienced degraded service with view/edit page experiences. The event was triggered by database overload due to an unexpected large burst of traffic. The database overload was the result of a configuration change, which led to a sudden spike in database connections, which impacted a subset of customers in a single partition in the us-east region. The incident was detected within 1 minute by by automated monitoring systems and mitigated by reducing the number of web server hosts connecting to the database layer, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The total time to resolution was about 1 hour and 26 minutes.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nThe overall impact was between\u00a0Jan 08, 2026, 14:54 UTC and 16:30 UTC on Confluence Cloud products. The incident caused service disruption to customers in a single partition in the us-east region impacting the ability to view and edit pages. We observed partition-wide database saturation due to an unexpected large burst of traffic. Confluence Cloud components impacted during this window were: Login, View / Edit Page, Publish Page, Add Page, Comment.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nA change was introduced that caused cross-region traffic routing for customers instead of routing to the same region. Some caches processing customer data were stale, which heavily loaded the databases and caused them to restart. As a result, the users of the product above could not login, view or edit pages, and the users received HTTP 500 and 504 errors.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn\u2019t identified due to a specific set of factors which resulted in this condition.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident:\n\n* Fix the routing issue that resulted in cross-regional traffic\n* Decrease maximum number of connections per database instance, to allow for sufficient memory capacity to handle a surge in connections\n\nFurthermore, we deploy our changes progressively \\(by cloud region\\) to avoid broad impact but in this case, the impact was larger than desired. To minimize the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we will implement additional preventative measures such as enabling automatic vertical scaling when database clusters are running low on memory.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking steps to help improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-08T19:09:42.448Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-08T15:27:17.401Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Confluence site unreachable for some users",
"updated_at": "2026-01-28T01:50:03.798Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/6gc829j8tb51"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available.\n\nThe issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian\u2019s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions.\n\nAll impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began.\n\n### IMPACT\n\nDuring the impact window, customers experienced:\n\n* **Outbound product email failures** \\(notifications and other product emails did not send\\).\n* **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \\(e.g. sign\u2011ups, password resets, one\u2011time\u2011password / step\u2011up challenges\\).\n* **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications**\n* **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing.\n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\nThe incident was caused by:\n\n1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal.\n2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully.\n\n### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\nWe recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers\u2019 ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes:\n\n* **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure**\n\n    * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry.\n    * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline.\n    \n* **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows**  \n  We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations.\n\nWe apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided.\n\nThanks,  \nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-27T05:20:21.496Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-27T02:48:17.950Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Outbound Email, Mobile Push Notifications, and Support Ticket Delivery Impacting All Cloud Products",
"updated_at": "2026-01-30T04:07:00.835Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/fz5p7klv7tj8"
},
{
"body": "On December 15th, 2025, Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Ecosystem, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, and Rovo users in the prod-us-east region may have experienced performance degradations and errors on the web page and mobile apps. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-15T19:01:49.869Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-15T16:26:38.964Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, and Rovo",
"updated_at": "2025-12-15T19:01:49.887Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/7k060kfdss8w"
},
{
"body": "The rollback required to resolve this issue is now completed, and we have verified across the impacted products that App installation behaviour is now working as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-11T04:37:14.163Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-11T01:08:43.933Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Errors installing Connect on Forge Apps in Confluence",
"updated_at": "2025-12-11T04:37:14.179Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/ysrb4l3hwp9h"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn November 21, 2025, between 13:44 and 15:16 UTC, Trello customers were intermittently unable to view and update data on their boards. Customers also may have experienced issues authenticating with Atlassian products, and creating new GitHub and Slack integrations.\n\nThe event was triggered by a bug encountered in the software running our edge proxy fleet, which proxies customer traffic to Atlassian cloud services. The changes included the migration of our edge proxy fleet to hosts running an ARM CPU architecture, rather than the AMD64 CPU architecture they had previously been running, which impacted US East customers.\n\nThe incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by a scale up of of fleet size, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. This was followed by a global migration of edge proxy fleet hosts back to AMD64 CPU architecture the following day.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the impact window, US East customers intermittently could not view or update data in Trello.\n\nThe same underlying issue also impacted our Identity services and integrations with GitHub and Slack, meaning some customers had trouble signing in to Atlassian products or creating new integrations. At the incident\u2019s peak, the incident impacted up to:\n\n* 52% of new Trello network connections.\n* 9% of new GitHub and Slack integrations.\n* 8% of new Identity network connections.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe issue was caused by a change to CPU architecture from AMD64 to ARM on our edge proxy fleet. This led to a bug that caused these instances to stall under high load, and refuse up to 52% of new connections. As a result, some customers of the products above could not make new connections to Atlassian services, and customers received CloudFront 504 gateway timeout error responses.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we deploy our changes progressively by cloud region to avoid broad impact, on this occasion, our pre-change load testing had not accurately reflected production loads.\n\nAs part of our response to this incident, and to help prevent recurrence, we rolled back all edge proxy fleets from ARM to AMD64 CPU architecture globally.\n\nTo minimise the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we plan to implement additional preventative measures such as:\n\n* Adding improved load tests into edge proxy fleet deployment pipelines to catch load-related bugs before deployment to production.\n* Adding alerts to our edge proxy fleet to catch rises in TCP connect times before customer impact.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking steps to help improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-21T16:49:34.172Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-21T14:55:09.138Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple Atlassian services experiencing degraded performance",
"updated_at": "2025-12-08T05:25:14.221Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/b9fzvq7np4ff"
},
{
"body": "Elevated Errors in Confluence Whiteboards and Databases Due to Cloudflare Outage\n\nCloudflare successfully deployed a fix for the issue that was impacting Confluence.  We are no longer seeing Confluence system performance degradation and Confluence systems have been fully restored. We will continue monitoring",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-18T16:57:12.921Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-18T13:32:36.448Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Elevated Errors in Confluence Whiteboards and Databases Due to Cloudflare Outage",
"updated_at": "2025-11-18T16:57:12.940Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/z7qy60bvp8x5"
},
{
"body": "Our team has been able to confirm that customers should no longer be experiencing the error while attempting to edit using Confluence.\nWe apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.\nThis issue is now resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-18T03:35:12.480Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-18T02:55:17.386Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Confluence presenting users with lost connection errors when attempting to edit content",
"updated_at": "2025-11-18T03:35:12.497Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/xw3xdppfjvqb"
},
{
"body": "On November 3, 2025, some Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Jira Cloud users may have experienced performance degradation and errors in the Global Automation UI page. Automation executions were not impacted by this incident. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-03T18:08:53.292Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-03T16:11:55.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance and intermittent errors",
"updated_at": "2025-11-03T18:08:53.313Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/qbfz3hs0wyx6"
},
{
"body": "Incident has been resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-30T02:09:45.000Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-29T06:47:04.679Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Atlassian cloud sites for some customers",
"updated_at": "2025-10-30T02:11:26.620Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/68k5rcrgndb2"
},
{
"body": "This incident has been resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-24T09:18:48.667Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-24T06:31:38.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Interruption to Confluence in APSE region",
"updated_at": "2025-10-24T09:18:48.687Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/7hgw3dylmh10"
},
{
"body": "Our teams have identified and fixed the root cause of the issue that caused delay in executing Automation rules. This was caused due to scaling issues following on from the recent AWS outage.\nThis issue is marked as resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-22T06:47:26.041Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-22T06:20:54.646Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Delay in execution of Automation rules",
"updated_at": "2025-10-22T11:36:06.371Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/hyvmv67zbt9q"
},
{
"body": "### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025\n\n### Summary\n\nAll dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise.\n\nCustomers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region.\n\nThe incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025.\n\nWe recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust.\n\n### IMPACT\n\nBefore examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies.\n\nProducts such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1.\n\nWhile in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes.\n\nHowever, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It\u2019s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer\u2019s chosen region.\n\n**Jira**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \\(NLB\\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions.\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval.\n\nNormally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers.\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide.\n\n**Jira Service Management \\(JSM\\)**\n\nJSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons.\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts.\n\n**Confluence**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively.\n\nThough the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes.\n\nTo protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored.\n\n**Automation**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution.\n\nDuring this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage.\n\nBy Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage.\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner.\n\n**Bitbucket and Pipelines**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services.\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers.\n\nFurthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025.\n\n**Trello**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments.\n\n**Login**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access.\n\nThe issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed.\n\n**Statuspage**\n\nBetween Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps.\n\n### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\nWe have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues:\n\n* Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage.\n* Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions.\n* Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages.\n\nAdditionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions:\n\n* Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service.\n\nAlthough disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues.\n\nWe recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-21T05:24:25.798Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-20T07:56:11.696Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Atlassian Cloud Services impacted",
"updated_at": "2025-11-25T03:54:52.729Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/wswkmmr4glyf"
},
{
"body": "Between 14:00 UTC to 16:00 UTC, we experienced automation rule functionality degradation for Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, and Jira. \n\nImpact\n\nSome customers using Jira, Confluence, and Jira Service Management were not able to create or update Automation rules, and some Automation rules which triggered webhooks might have been throttled and require re-running. Approximately 50 percent of Automation API calls were affected in the us-east-1 region with customers receiving 429 status codes.\n\nCurrent Status\n\nThe incident has been mitigated by increasing the API Gateway rate limit service quota and disabling the internal service that was causing high traffic volume. \n\nNext Steps\n\nWe are conducting a root cause analysis of the internal service. A post incident review will be conducted.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-15T16:16:07.105Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-15T13:43:56.097Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Unable to perform UI Operations",
"updated_at": "2025-10-15T16:16:07.120Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/83n3wzjlplgh"
},
{
"body": "On September 29-30 2025, for about 24 hours, Confluence Cloud experienced an incident due to the unintended deprecation of ACJS methods (https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/confluence/about-the-connect-javascript-api/#connect-javascript-api) linked to retired V1 APIs (https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/confluence/rest/v1/), resulting in 410 errors affecting partners reliant on these APIs. \n\nThis issue is resolved, we will be working on a longer-term solution to prevent a similar incident from occurring again.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-09-30T17:15:49.000Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-09-30T17:15:49.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Issues for some partners using Connect Javascript APIs",
"updated_at": "2025-10-08T21:55:04.593Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/40vn27rcpjtz"
},
{
"body": "### **SUMMARY**\n\nOn September 22, 2025, between 04:38 and 04:48 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced connection errors preventing access to their [atlassian.net](http://atlassian.net/) sites. Some customers observed intermittent errors as services gradually recovered until 06:17 UTC.\n\nThe event was triggered by a faulty configuration change to our Content Delivery Network \\(CDN\\). The change included an invalid hostname which prevented customers from successfully connecting to [atlassian.net](http://atlassian.net/) domains.\n\nThe incident was detected within 1 minute by our monitoring systems and mitigated by rolling back the change, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The acute impact was resolved in 10 minutes and all lingering errors resolved in 1 hour 38 minutes.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nThe acute impact occurred on\u00a0September 22, 2025, between 04:38 UTC and 04:48 UTC to Confluence, Compass and Jira, including Jira Service Management. The incident caused service disruption to customers when they attempted to load those products in their browser or interact with APIs. Between 04:48 UTC and 06:17 UTC some customers continued to observe intermittent errors as services gradually recovered.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe issue was caused by a change to the hostname configuration of our Content Delivery Network \\(CDN\\). As a result, the products mentioned could not receive connections, and the users received TLS handshake errors, followed by HTTP 503 and 403 errors.\n\nMore specifically a new CDN configuration contained a resource name which conflicted with the existing customer-serving CDN resource, and was able to be deployed, overwriting it. The root cause of the incident was the failure in the detection of the bug by our pre-deployment validations and tests.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that you rely on our products for your daily operations and productivity, and we sincerely apologize for any impact this disruption has had on you, your team or your organisation.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident:\n\n* Improved pre-deployment change controls and testing.\n* Improved validation of target configurations before deployment to ensure customer-serving CDN resources cannot their hostnames changed.\n* Sharding of our CDN configuration to enable progressive changes.\n\nWe sincerely appreciate your understanding and patience as we improve our processes to provide a better customer experience.\n\nThank you,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-09-22T07:17:23.603Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-09-22T05:09:32.247Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Degraded performance to multiple Atlassian experiences",
"updated_at": "2025-10-01T06:20:10.137Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/zb1czsfvg0tk"
},
{
"body": "An update has been released by Microsoft to resolve this issue for users of the Edge browser. To verify that you are running the required version of Edge, you can navigate to edge://components/ in the address bar, click the 'Check for update' button for the 'Trust Protections List', ensuring that you are on version 1.0.0.31 or higher to ensure you are running the version that contains the fixed release.\nAll Edge browsers should otherwise receive this update within 10 hours without user intervention.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-09-15T06:40:39.763Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-09-09T10:23:55.779Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance in Confluence and Jira for Microsoft Edge users",
"updated_at": "2025-09-15T06:40:39.778Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/xw6n615ghy9m"
}
]
}