{
"vendor": "Files",
"slug": "files",
"platform": "statuspage",
"status_url": "https://status.files.com",
"last_checked": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"last_state": "ok",
"history_backfilled": true,
"first_watched": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"incidents": [
{
"body": "Between 17:13 UTC on June 4, 2026 and 15:12 UTC on June 5, 2026, [Files.com](http://Files.com) customers using SFTP with ed25519 SSH key-based authentication experienced authentication failures. This incident was limited to SFTP connections using ed25519 public keys. All other authentication methods \u2014 including password-based SFTP authentication, RSA key authentication, and all other [Files.com](http://Files.com) protocols and services \u2014 continued to operate normally throughout this period.\n\nWe deployed a change to our SFTP server infrastructure intended to improve host key handling, but it inadvertently broke the authentication path for clients using ed25519 public keys.\n\nWe failed to catch this regression before it reached production. We use automated testing to avoid this sort of regression, but there was a gap around specific combinations of ciphers and authentication flows. We have expanded our test suite to ensure every possible SFTP authentication path is tested.\n\nIn addition, we did not manually verify ed25519 authentication during pre-deploy validation. This was a failure in our testing process and we are updating our guidelines around similar changes going forward.\n\nWe also failed to detect this regression through our own monitoring. A latent bug in our internal compliance logging pipeline caused log events from the affected authentication sessions to be silently dropped rather than stored. Because these failed login\u00a0attempts were not surfacing in our monitoring systems, we did not detect the incident internally\u2014we learned of it from customer reports beginning on the morning of June 5, 2026. We have resolved the logging bug, and added alerting to this part of the logging pipeline to ensure future failures are surfaced immediately.\n\nWe resolved the incident at 15:12 UTC on June 5, 2026 by rolling back the SFTP change and restarting all SFTP services across all regions. We confirmed the fix across affected customer accounts in all regions. As soon as we completely understood the situation, we posted an update to our status page.\n\nThe root cause of this incident was [Files.com](http://Files.com)'s insufficient test coverage for all possible authentication paths, combined with a monitoring failure that prevented early detection. We have corrected both.\n\nOur customers trust us with their most sensitive and time-critical workflows, and we understand the disruption this caused. We are sorry. Our entire engineering team is committed to the improvements needed to prevent this type of incident from occurring again. If you need additional assistance or continue to experience issues, please contact our Customer Support team.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-05T08:00:00.000-07:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-05T08:00:00.000-07:00",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "SFTP Login Failures for ed25519 key-based authentication only in all regions",
"updated_at": "2026-06-08T14:23:47.984-07:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/k06cmc4qmt06"
},
{
"body": "Between 13:30 and 13:39 UTC on May 26, 2026, the [Files.com](http://Files.com) platform experienced a 9-minute issue during which uploads, as well as create, update, and delete operations against any resource, failed. Logins, downloads, and listings were unaffected during this period. Authentication-only and read-only workflows continued to operate normally.\n\n\u00a0The issue was caused by a routine maintenance event on our underlying Aurora MySQL database cluster, which moved the writer role from one database instance to another. Our application failed to recognize this change and continued attempting to write to the previous instance, which was now operating in a read-only capacity. We restored full write capability at 13:39 UTC by restarting the application, which forced it to reconnect to the correct database.\n\n\u00a0[Files.com](http://Files.com) is aware of this role changing mechanism and had built handling for it that had been previously tested in production. That code regressed during a framework upgrade and stopped functioning, and we failed to detect the regression because we did not have a standing test that exercises a database failover in our staging environment. We are correcting both gaps. We are restoring proper failover behavior in the application, and we are adding an automated failover test in staging so that this class of regression cannot ship undetected again.\n\n\u00a0We also identified that the maintenance window for our database cluster is currently scheduled during US business hours, which means routine, automated maintenance events occur at exactly the wrong time of day for our customers. We are moving this window to an off-peak time.\n\n\u00a0We promise a system that works perfectly, all of the time, and today we failed to deliver that to you. We are particularly disappointed because [Files.com](http://Files.com) had previously solved this exact failure mode and allowed a regression to ship. Our entire engineering team is working hard to prevent issues like this one from occurring in the future. If you need additional assistance or continue to experience issues, please contact our Customer Support team.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-26T07:06:35.000-07:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-26T07:06:35.000-07:00",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Uploads, create, update and delete operations failures",
"updated_at": "2026-07-28T05:21:36.284-07:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/6svkxh1mvhvp"
},
{
"body": "From 17:32 UTC until 19:14 UTC on April 1, 2026, a subset of servers in our primary US region returned TLS errors that produced elevated failure rates across the [Files.com](http://Files.com) Web UI, API, FTP/S, SFTP, and WebDAV.\n\nCustomers whose traffic was routed to unaffected hosts experienced no issues; others saw login timeouts or \"invalid password\" messages.\n\n**What Happened**  \nWhile adding an additional domain to our primary wildcard SSL certificate, a bug in our internal certificate management software generated a certificate that omitted the wildcard entries for many of our domains. Our automated certificate rotation process then installed that faulty certificate on a portion of the fleet, causing those hosts to reject connections. Because traffic is  \nload-balanced evenly, some customer sessions failed while others succeeded, making the issue difficult to detect on global dashboards.\n\nWe identified the certificate issue and generated a corrected certificate within 10 minutes. However, the incorrect certificate remained deployed for an additional 92 minutes. This second delay is the most frustrating part of this incident.\n\nRecent modifications to our certificate rotation system had not been reflected in our internal documentation. As a result, our on-call engineers were working from outdated instructions for manually forcing a certificate rotation. It took additional time to uncover the correct process for performing the manual rotation.\n\n**What We Have Done To Mitigate This In The Future**  \nWe have updated our certificate generation to avoid the accidental omission of wildcard entries through additional validation.\n\nWe have added an additional monitoring check that which continuously verifies deployed certificates on every public endpoint for the correct wildcard entries.\n\nWe have documented the certificate-rotation mechanism and emergency override procedure in  \nour internal documentation.\n\nWe know our customers rely on [Files.com](http://Files.com) for mission-critical workflows, and any service interruption is unacceptable. We apologize for the disruption and appreciate your patience as we improve our safeguards to ensure this does not recur.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-01T10:30:00.000-07:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-01T10:30:00.000-07:00",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Elevated Errors \u2013 USA Region",
"updated_at": "2026-04-08T11:22:29.957-07:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/tm2kcngdtfpn"
},
{
"body": "From approximately 18:20 UTC to 19:23 UTC on 10 February 2026, customers could not preview or edit Office documents in the [Files.com](http://Files.com) Editor.\u00a0 All other [Files.com](http://Files.com) services remained fully available.\n\n\u00a0\n\n**What happened**\n\nOur document-editing service relies on an internal message broker \\(Amazon MQ / RabbitMQ\\).\u00a0 A routine broker maintenance reboot caused our editor software to stop accepting new editing sessions but continued to report itself as healthy.\u00a0 Because our health check logic was flawed and yielding that incorrect status, our load balancer kept sending traffic to the failing servers, resulting in the spinning \u201cLoading\u2026\u201d message you observed.\n\n\u00a0\n\n**What we found**\n\n* The editor\u2019s own health endpoint did accurately represent its real status after the broker reboot but that was not known because the failure response was a HTTP 200 OK with the body of \u201cfalse\u201d.\n\n* Our Consul monitoring treated any HTTP 200 as healthy, so no automatic alert fired.\n\n* This same chain of events occurred on 20 January but was not fully remediated.\n\n\u00a0\n\n**What we are doing**\n\n1. Updating the Consul health check to validate the response body and fail closed when the editor reports \u201cfalse\u201d.\n2. Enabling CloudWatch logs and metrics for Amazon MQ and alerting on broker restarts and AMQP channel errors.\n3. Adding an integration test that continuously opens and saves a document in production and pages engineering if it stalls.\n4. We are working to replicate the exact error scenario in staging by creating a full production-like cluster. Once replicated, we will use that data to craft a solution to prevent this error from reoccurring.\n\n\u00a0\n\nWe failed to detect the problem promptly and allowed it to recur.\u00a0 We know you rely on the [Files.com](http://Files.com) Editor for time-critical collaborative work, and we are sorry for the disruption.\u00a0 The actions above are already in progress, and we will publish further updates on our status page as milestones are reached.\u00a0 Thank you for your continued trust in [Files.com](http://Files.com).",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-10T10:30:00.000-08:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-10T10:30:00.000-08:00",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Failures loading the Files.com Editor",
"updated_at": "2026-04-08T11:25:35.044-07:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/wtfk7bv828jy"
},
{
"body": "We have resolved an incident causing failures to load the Files.com Editor in our web interface.  \n\nThis incident was resolved at 19:45 UTC on January 20th.  \n\nOffice documents can once again be previewed and edited in the built-in Files.com Editor.  \n\nWe apologize for the inconvenience that this incident caused.  We will perform a full postmortem on this incident and publish the report here when it is available.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-20T12:02:09.360-08:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-20T11:44:23.947-08:00",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Failures loading the Files.com Editor",
"updated_at": "2026-01-20T12:02:09.378-08:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/0ymbcb9090hz"
},
{
"body": "From 21:45 UTC to 22:55 UTC on 9 January 2026, a subset of customers with custom domains enabled experienced elevated \u201c500 \u2013 Internal Server Error\u201d responses when uploading \\(and in some cases downloading\\) files through certain Remote Server Mount\u2013backed transfer paths, including [Files.com](http://Files.com) Agent- backed connections.\n\nA code change in the [Files.com](http://Files.com) API control plane, intended to correct a bug in custom-domain uploads, introduced an unintended error condition affecting uploads routed through remote server mounts for sites with custom domains. Specifically, the API returned an invalid \\(blank\\) upload URL in its response, which caused subsequent upload steps to fail and resulted in HTTP 500 errors.\n\nThese errors were immediately generated and logged by our application. Under normal conditions, this error volume would have triggered an automated PagerDuty alert to our on-call engineering team. However, a misconfiguration in our error-tracking system \\(Sentry\\) caused the majority of these error events to be suppressed. As a result, the expected alerts were not generated, and the issue was not immediately paged to on-call staff.\n\nAlthough our CI and production canary testing do exercise Agent-backed and Remote Server Mount upload workflows, those tests are not currently executed against customer sites using custom domains. Because this defect only manifested when custom domains were combined with remote server mounts, this edge case was not detected during pre-production testing.\n\nThe issue was ultimately identified through customer reports, which prompted immediate investigation and remediation. A patch was verified in staging at 22:48 UTC and deployed to production at 22:55 UTC, fully restoring normal operation. We corrected the Sentry configuration and deployed new, version-controlled Terraform configuration to ensure that critical production errors always generate complete telemetry and alerts.\n\nWe will also expand automated tests and deployment canaries to explicitly cover custom domain configurations so that this class of issue is detected during pre- production testing.\n\nThis incident represents our most significant service disruption in the past year. While the issue affected a relatively small portion of our customer base, it had a material impact on those customers, with disruptions lasting more than an hour for some workflows. We are acutely aware that for the customers affected, the scope of the impact matters far more than the size of the cohort.\n\nWe are extremely embarrassed by this failure. At the same time, we believe it is important to provide full transparency: even with this incident, [Files.com](http://Files.com) continued to meet and exceed its contractual SLA commitments for the month. That fact does not lessen the seriousness of the disruption, but it does highlight the overall resilience of the platform and our ongoing investment in reliability.\n\nWe recognize that many customers depend on Remote Server Mounts for time- critical and business-critical workflows, and that any interruption is unacceptable. We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused and for the impact to your operations. We take this failure seriously and are committed to maintaining the level of reliability and trust you expect from [Files.com](http://Files.com). If you have any questions or would like to discuss this incident further, our Support team stands ready to assist.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-09T15:45:00.000-08:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-09T08:00:00.000-08:00",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Sites with Custom Domains only:  Failures Uploading and downloading to Remote Server Mounts",
"updated_at": "2026-01-22T15:51:01.539-08:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/2mw3w2dr7s8f"
},
{
"body": "We have resolved an issue which caused elevated error rates in outbound connections from Files.com to Sharepoint and OneDrive remote servers.  \n\nThe impact was limited to these two remote server integrations and did not impact any inbound connections to Files.com that don\u2019t involve Onedrive or SharePoint remote servers. This incident occurred between the times of 1:23PM and 2:58PM UTC.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-25T05:23:00.000-08:00",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-25T05:23:00.000-08:00",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Outbound Connections to Sharepoint and OneDrive: Elevated Error Rates",
"updated_at": "2025-11-25T07:40:25.230-08:00",
"url": "https://stspg.io/fnxl2k67l3kd"
}
]
}