{
"vendor": "Jira Service Management",
"slug": "jira-service-management",
"platform": "statuspage",
"status_url": "https://jira-service-management.status.atlassian.com",
"last_checked": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"last_state": "ok",
"history_backfilled": true,
"first_watched": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"incidents": [
{
"body": "On September 14, 2026, Opsgenie and Jira Service Management experienced a disruption, and impacted users saw delayed alerts notification and inability to view the alerts in the user interface.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-15T12:28:18Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-09-14T17:43:30.670Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-09-14T16:46:06.318Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted Opsgenie/JSM availability",
"updated_at": "2026-09-14T17:43:30.687Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/l18v31t3cqnq"
},
{
"body": "On 11 September 2026, Between 07:02 UTC and 07:56 UTC, some Jira Software and Jira Service Management users may have experienced degraded performance and errors when accessing Work Items and Boards.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved, and all services are operating normally.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-11T12:29:42Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-09-11T08:37:46.866Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-09-11T07:46:31.093Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance affecting Jira Software and Jira Service Management",
"updated_at": "2026-09-11T08:37:46.888Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/3mw650bc2djs"
},
{
"body": "On September 3, 2026, some Jira Service Management users may have experienced errors viewing the Affected Services field or performance degradation on the web. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-09-03T17:03:43.242Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-09-03T14:20:25.580Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Jira Service Management - Degradation with Affected Services Field",
"updated_at": "2026-09-03T17:03:43.260Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/kdjpr5v3lh24"
},
{
"body": "On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. \n\nThe issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "none",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-09-01T11:44:04.682Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-09-01T10:11:45.330Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Jira - Work Item transition failures",
"updated_at": "2026-09-01T11:44:04.698Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/0wpylxd56m7m"
},
{
"body": "**SUMMARY**\n\n  \n\nOn August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state.\n\nAfter the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic.\n\n  \n\n**IMPACT**\n\n  \n\nThe overall impact was split into two discrete periods:\n\n  \n\n-   First, on\u00a027 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location.\n-   Second, on\u00a027 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions.\n\n  \n\n**ROOT CAUSE**\n\n  \n\nThe event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions.\n\nAfter the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again.\n\n  \n\n**REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\n  \n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn\u2019t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident:\n\n  \n\n-   **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service.\n-   **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn\u2019t occur again.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-27T05:16:07.455Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-27T04:22:09.128Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Issues accessing multiple Atlassian products in some regions",
"updated_at": "2026-09-07T02:53:20.926Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/wtpl0h6xdf9g"
},
{
"body": "On 25th Aug 2026, some users may have experienced increased latency in email, mobile and slack notifications.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-25T14:33:57.209Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-25T08:42:48.027Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Notifications are delayed",
"updated_at": "2026-08-25T14:33:57.225Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/0tny3nv6gn6g"
},
{
"body": "On August 24, 2026, some JIRA, JSM, and Confluence users may have experienced performance degradation resulting in increased latency in email, mobile, and Slack notifications. The issue has been resolved for newly created notifications, and service is operating normally.\n\nThere may be older notifications that are being processed, and we expect them to be completed in next few hours.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-24T23:15:20.757Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-24T19:22:47.461Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Notifications",
"updated_at": "2026-08-24T23:15:20.772Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/h46b3jvp1lrc"
},
{
"body": "On August 7th - 2026, between 10:27 UTC to 11:49 UTC, some users in the Central European region may have experienced service access issues.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-07T12:52:23.031Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-07T11:30:55.293Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Performance and access related issues with Jira",
"updated_at": "2026-08-07T12:52:23.051Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/64t7mdzvgmb3"
},
{
"body": "On August 7, 2026, JIRA, JWM, and JSM users may have experienced performance degradation when viewing issues and boards. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-08-07T01:46:47.649Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-08-07T01:33:21.116Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of JIRA",
"updated_at": "2026-08-07T01:46:47.662Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/nbfx7rvx8yhx"
},
{
"body": "Our notification provider has identified the root of the issue that is causing voice call failures to some India-based mobile numbers. \n\nWe understand the inconvenience this may cause and appreciate your patience while our provider works on restoring the service. If you have experienced any issues with voice notifications, please contact our Support for assistance.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-24T13:07:13.324Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-07-21T09:48:22.457Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Voice call failures for some India based numbers",
"updated_at": "2026-07-24T13:07:13.343Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/jnwlc1hc7c38"
},
{
"body": "Our team has been able to validate that all rule executions are performing normally and this issue is now resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-22T00:56:03.277Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-07-20T20:18:31.402Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Jira Automation rules",
"updated_at": "2026-07-22T00:56:03.301Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/2h64wj6psytm"
},
{
"body": "On July 20, 2026, some Jira and Jira Service Management users may have experienced performance degradation of automation rule executions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-20T17:23:09.681Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-07-20T16:03:35.374Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Jira Automation rules",
"updated_at": "2026-07-20T17:23:09.701Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/g65shv8fkbgm"
},
{
"body": "## Summary\n\nOn Jul 6, 2026, between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC, Atlassian customers using cloud products in European (EU) regions experienced service disruptions affecting automation rule execution, user search, user picker, and related workflows. The incident began when a core identity service experienced database saturation in EU regions, increasing latency and error rates. While responders worked to restore capacity, an emergency mitigation was applied which blocked automation rules from accessing the identity endpoint. In parallel, the elevated identity latency contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service, degrading user search and user picker experiences across multiple products. Service was progressively restored after additional database read capacity was added, the emergency block was removed, and the user search service was manually scaled up.\n\n  \n\n## Impact\n\nThe incident affected customers across multiple Atlassian products in EU regions on Jul 6, 2026 between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC.\n\n-   **Core Identity service degradation:** elevated intermittent access denied rates were observed across products in EU regions.\n-   **Automation rule execution failures:** automation rules using the default user (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error.\n-   **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capability largely unavailable across products.\n\n  \n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe incident originated from a recent configuration change that reduced the cache lifetime for a core identity service. As EU workday traffic ramped up on July 6, 2026, a larger share of requests began reaching the backing database directly rather than being served from cache. The EU databases did not have sufficient regional capacity to absorb the increased load, and database CPU reached saturation, causing elevated intermittent access denied rates.\n\nAs part of the mitigation, an emergency block was applied to reduce load on the saturated identity service database and prioritize restoring the core identity service. This inadvertently prevented automation rules from passing their pre-execution permission checks, causing them to fail. The extended duration was primarily due to a secondary wave of automation rule failures caused by the processing limit throttling.\n\nIn parallel, the sustained degradation caused increased latency and intermittent failures across products that depend on these checks, and contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service. As a result, user search and user picker experiences became largely unavailable in EU regions until the permissions service recovered and the user search service was scaled up to restore capacity.\n\n  \n\n## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps\n\nWe know outages impact customers' productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n-   **Improve safeguards for high-impact emergency mitigations:** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review.\n-   **Strengthen identity infrastructure capacity and change safety:** Review regional database sizing and capacity headroom to reduce the risk of saturation during peak traffic periods, and refine the assessment process for configuration changes so downstream load impact is evaluated before production rollout.\n-   **Strengthen resilience against cascading failures from upstream degradation:** Audit backpressure handling, circuit breaker configuration, and autoscaling behavior in services, so that upstream degradation does not cause broader product impact across user search, user picker, and related experiences.\n-   **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Increase resilience of automation rules to reduce impact associated with incidents occurring in dependencies..\n\nWe recognize how critical reliable product workflows are for our customers, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-07-06T13:04:01.967Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-07-06T09:23:39.292Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Reliability issues with Jira and Confluence",
"updated_at": "2026-07-17T16:59:38.069Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/tr43y4jdgclr"
},
{
"body": "Our team has proactively reached out to all impacted organizations providing the below instructions to re-authorize their Microsoft mail server. If you are still experiencing this issue, please attempt to complete the re-authorization as advised below.\n\nIf further issues still occur that you believe to be related to this incident, please reach out to Atlassian support for further assistance.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-26T05:13:01.481Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-19T22:46:56.478Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Jira : Incoming emails partial outage",
"updated_at": "2026-06-26T05:13:01.510Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/x932djl5306z"
},
{
"body": "On June 10 2026, between 08:10 and 09:08 UTC, users experienced degraded performance and inability to load the Assets page, which is impacting the ability to create, update, and delete assets. \n\nWe have implemented a fix and services have been restored to normal operation for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-10T10:00:29.240Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-10T09:42:42.542Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Unable to load Assets page",
"updated_at": "2026-06-10T10:00:29.300Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/9y0yybjd7jsn"
},
{
"body": "We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected.\n\nWe apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-10T06:31:05.118Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-10T04:55:13.724Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Delays in processing incoming Emails, Work Item notifications, and Scheduled Triggers in Marketplace Apps",
"updated_at": "2026-06-10T06:31:05.194Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/2pq565q12h85"
},
{
"body": "The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-09T18:27:54.300Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-09T05:29:37.539Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Some users experiencing issues viewing boards and work items",
"updated_at": "2026-06-09T18:27:54.323Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/ws0xswrspv8v"
},
{
"body": "On June 08 2026, between 01:30 and 02:40 UTC, users experienced degraded performance with Jira Software front-end experiences affecting view board, navigation, and backlog across multiple regions. \n\nWe have implemented a fix and services have been restored to normal operation. We continue to monitor the situation closely.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-08T02:56:32.275Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-08T01:53:57.093Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Users experiencing issues loading work items in Jira and JSM",
"updated_at": "2026-06-08T02:56:32.363Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/gn5h3tg2qchz"
},
{
"body": "On June 2, 2026, some Jira and Jira Service Management users in the US-East region may have experienced performance degradation of automation rule executions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. Previously delayed automation rules are expected to be completed within 12 hours.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-02T16:51:29.000Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-02T15:32:55.551Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Jira and JSM automations in US East",
"updated_at": "2026-06-02T19:42:53.205Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/tcc90nhgnszz"
},
{
"body": "**SUMMARY**\n\n  \n\nOn June 01, 2026, between 06:54 and 08:28 UTC, Atlassian customers using Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Work Management were unable to view issues, boards, and backlogs, and experienced errors when performing transitions, adding comments, and navigating the product. The event was triggered by caching infrastructure autoscaling failure. The issue only impacted customers hosted in Europe. The incident was detected within 8 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by progressively scaling the caching clusters manually. The total time to resolution was 1 hour and 34 minutes due to the progressive recovery.\n\n  \n\n**IMPACT**\n\n  \n\nThe incident caused service disruption for customers hosted in the Europe region who were unable to access core experiences across Jira Software, Jira Service Management, and Jira Work Management.\n\n  \n\n**ROOT CAUSE**\n\n  \n\nThe root cause of the incident was a capacity constraint on our caching infrastructure in one availability zone of our EU Central cloud region. As morning traffic increased, our caching clusters attempted to scale out automatically. However, the cloud infrastructure was unable to provision additional nodes in that availability zone due to insufficient underlying capacity.\n\nOur caching infrastructure is designed to scale across multiple availability zones to ensure balanced and resilient capacity. On this occasion, a capacity constraint in one availability zone prevented the scaling operation from completing as expected.\n\nWith the caching layer unable to grow to meet demand, the clusters began to experience network and/or CPU saturation and could not handle all incoming requests within the expected timeout window. Since a single user request to Jira typically involves multiple cache calls, timeouts compound rapidly. As more threads became blocked waiting on timed-out or slow cache operations, the application nodes reached its busy thread limit and began shedding load. While additional application nodes were added, these also experienced the same thread limit saturation due to the saturation of the cache layer resulting in widespread 503 service unavailable errors for customers.\n\n  \n\n**REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\n  \n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. In addition to existing safeguards and monitoring, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n  \n\n-   **Increased minimum caching cluster size**: We have increased the minimum number of nodes in all affected caching clusters in the EU Central region. This ensures sufficient capacity headroom to handle peak traffic without relying on autoscaling, reducing the risk of a similar failure occurring.\n-   **Change autoscaling behaviour**: We are working on improvements to our autoscaling behaviour to fall back to other availability zones when capacity is unavailable in a single zone.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-06-01T13:23:43.563Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-06-01T08:06:30.496Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "For Jira-software viewIssues and viewBoard are degraded",
"updated_at": "2026-06-12T06:49:17.749Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/wbmjtjlrrvzd"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n* **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards**\n\n    * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation.\n    * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region.\n    \n* **Reduce cross-region impact**\n\n    * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions.\n    \n\nWe recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-14T06:48:27.734Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-14T05:03:32.407Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Users experiencing issues accessing multiple Atlassian products",
"updated_at": "2026-05-19T19:06:31.876Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/bnp82y79shhs"
},
{
"body": "This incident has been resolved.\n\nDuring the incident window, some customers using Atlassian Assist experienced excessive notifications as our team replayed delayed events caused by this prior incident:\nhttps://jira-service-management.status.atlassian.com/incidents/v307yb60q5g7\n\nOur engineering team identified and addressed the issue. All services have fully recovered, and notification delivery is operating normally. No data loss occurred as a result of this incident.\n\nWe apologize for the disruption and any confusion caused by the excessive notifications.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-14T09:41:59.137Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-14T01:15:35.189Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Excessive notifications being received by some Jira Service Management users",
"updated_at": "2026-05-14T09:41:59.155Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/sbqbvjppht1x"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\n###   \n\nOn May 12, 2026 between 19:01 and 20:46 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers may have experienced delays in background operations and automation processes. Some background operations, such as notifications or search indexing, were delayed until May 14, 2026 19:25 UTC due to increased cross-region traffic.\n\n  \n\nThe issue stemmed from a latent bug in the event processing pipeline. Automated monitoring detected the incident within 16 minutes, and it was mitigated through manual rollback within 1 hour and 45 minutes. Recovery of cross-region event delivery from the affected timeframe took 48 hours due to infrastructure scale constraints.\n\n  \n\n### IMPACT\n\n###   \n\nDuring the incident, customers may have experienced delays in background operations like automation, search indexing, notifications, and permission synchronization. The event processing pipeline distributes events between Atlassian services to support these background operations.\n\n-   On May 12, 2026, at 19:01 UTC, the deployment of a routing configuration increased event volume across cross-region services. At 20:46 UTC, rolling back routing configurations resolved the issue.\n-   Processing the accumulated cross-region message backlog finished by May 14, 2026, at 19:25 UTC.\n\n**Automation & Jira Service Management**\n\nSome Atlassian customers experienced event-triggered rules delayed or executed multiple times during the recovery window.\n\n  \n\n**Confluence**\n\nSome Atlassian customers experienced delays in search indexing and possible duplicate notifications and automation rule executions during the recovery window.\n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\n###   \n\nThe issue arose from the deployment of a routing configuration change to the event processing platform, exposing a latent bug in legacy configurations. This change distributed higher volume of events to cross-region services. Cross-region services validated and discarded extra events but needed greater scale to handle the increased influx.\n\nThe mitigation involved rolling back the configuration change in the event platform. Recovery involved scaling cross-region services to handle higher inbound traffic.\n\n### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\n###   \n\nWe know that performance degradations impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn\u2019t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of legacy case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following improvements to help prevent similar incidents in future:\n\n-   Enhance runtime metrics across critical-path configurations to predict change impact before deployment.\n-   Enhance failover capabilities to create and replace infrastructure components to respond faster to increased processing demands.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-13T09:59:05.051Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-13T01:37:34.583Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Automations within Jira, Jira Service Management and JSM Assist experiencing delays for some users",
"updated_at": "2026-06-01T21:50:10.708Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/nnf50c1jnjdk"
},
{
"body": "All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise.\n\n### Summary\n\nOn May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution.\n\nThe incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nThe primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation.\n\n* Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline.\n* At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows.\n* At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00.\n* By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing\n\n**Automation**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected.\n\nAt 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed.\n\nBeginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded.\n\n**Jira and Jira Service Management**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident.\n\nJira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products.\n\nAt 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded.\n\n**Confluence**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation.\n\nThe underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed.\n\nBetween 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync.\n\n**Bitbucket and Pipelines**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident.\n\nAutomatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits.\n\nAt approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes.\n\n**Identity Services**\n\nBetween 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident.\n\nThe impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays.\n\nAfter the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services.\n\nWe are prioritizing improvements that will:\n\n* **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions.\n* **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-08T19:45:31.386Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-08T01:31:38.339Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple Atlassian services are experiencing issues",
"updated_at": "2026-05-20T06:49:00.200Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/vw9bc0r2f93q"
},
{
"body": "The issue causing failures in the lookup objects within JSM Automation has been resolved. A fix was implemented to address the problem and the service is now operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-06T11:17:12.753Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-06T09:35:20.062Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Lookup Objects in Automation for Jira Service Management are not functioning",
"updated_at": "2026-05-06T11:17:12.769Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/rqrjwwsqnf7w"
},
{
"body": "### SUMMARY\n\n###   \n\nBetween May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC and May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management (JSM) across all Cloud tenants received an error page when attempting to open a work item due to a schema incompatibility, and editing work item fields was degraded for both products. Navigating to and interacting with boards were degraded for Jira specifically. On Jira mobile, users were unable to view work items and work item search was degraded. This was caused by a deployment of a schema configuration change that had only been validated against some production environments.\n\n  \n\nThe issue also affected Atlassian's customer support operations and temporarily impacted Atlassian\u2019s ability to respond to incoming support requests. Customers were able to raise tickets as usual.\n\n  \n\nAtlassian\u2019s automated monitoring systems detected the issue on May 1, 2026 at 23:41 UTC, and engineering teams promptly began investigating.\n\n  \n\nThe issue was reported on Statuspage on May 2, 2026 at 00:55 UTC.\n\n  \n\nThe issue was resolved after 3 hours and 19 minutes on May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC when the previous version of the schema configuration was successfully redeployed to all regions.\n\n  \n\n### IMPACT\n\n###   \n\n-   **Duration**: 3 hours 19 minutes (May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC \u2013 May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC)\n-   **Affected regions**: All regions.\n-   **Affected products**: Jira, JSM, Jira Mobile\n-   **Customer experience**:\n-   Users were unable to view work items using the work item view; consequently updating and creating work items from the work item view was affected.\n-   Editing work items was degraded.\n-   Boards did not show under Spaces in the Jira navigation.\n-   Certain board interactions were affected.\n-   Other areas of Jira not dependent on the broken schema configuration continued to operate normally.\n\n###   \n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\n###   \n\nThe root cause was a deployment sequencing issue. A schema configuration change was deployed to the API gateway layer before the corresponding application-level change had been deployed across all production environments. This created a mismatch between the schema expected by the gateway and the schema served by the application servers.\n\n###   \n\n### MITIGATIONS\n\n###   \n\nThe engineering team identified the problematic schema change and initiated a rollback of the deployment. A deployment blocker was put in place to prevent further changes while the rollback was executed. The previous version of the schema configuration was redeployed, and service was restored across all regions.\n\n###   \n\n### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\n###   \n\nWe understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur:\n\n-   We are adding automated pre-deployment checks to verify that schema configurations are compatible across all production environments before changes are deployed.\n-   We will streamline our incident communication processes, incident response training and tooling to reduce the time between incident detection and customer notification.\n-   We are working to improve resilience of critical customer-facing support services to ensure SLA continuity during outages.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future.\n\n  \n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-05-02T02:48:03.154Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-05-02T00:55:47.627Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "The Work Item view experience of Jira is restored",
"updated_at": "2026-05-14T19:44:10.000Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/7657bc1x11mt"
},
{
"body": "On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-14T16:11:31.136Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-14T12:12:58.154Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted Rovo availability for Automation rules",
"updated_at": "2026-04-14T16:11:31.157Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/7qpnq2sp04tn"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\n* **Duration**: ~40 minutes \\(05:49\u201306:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\\)\n* **Affected regions**: US East and EU \\(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\\).\n* **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello.\n* **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThis incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention.\n\n**The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm.\n\n**The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery.\n\nThe incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute.\n\n**REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience:\n\n1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled.\n2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts.\n3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s reliability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-13T10:17:21.612Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-13T07:29:45.552Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Users experiencing issues with login across Atlassian products",
"updated_at": "2026-04-21T02:33:07.044Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/920pm1cky7gr"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. \n\nA configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high\u2011density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers.\n\nThe root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period.\n\nImpacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context.\n\n**Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions.\n\n**Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue.\n\n**Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC.\n\n**Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC.\n\n**Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nAtlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. \n\nAn infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \\(CPU & Memory\\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products.\n\nThe change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst\u2011affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur:\n\n* **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types**  \n  Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly.\n* **Strengthen automated pre\u2011deploy validation for resource changes**  \n  Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads.\n* **Improve post\u2011deploy verification and alerting**  \n  Enhance monitoring and post\u2011deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod\u2011IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out.\n* **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits**  \n  Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts.\n* **Enhance recovery automation**  \n  Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-04-08T11:43:29.195Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-04-08T06:24:47.129Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple products impacted by search failures",
"updated_at": "2026-04-17T16:23:20.794Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/gv0tw9530tbt"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn March 18, 2026, between 10:06 and 13:47 UTC, customers experienced delays in Automation rules executing when triggered by Jira events such as Work Item creation, Work Item updates, and comments. Automation rules using other trigger types, including scheduled triggers, manual triggers, and incoming webhooks, continued to operate normally.\n\nThe incident was caused by an internal configuration change that inadvertently disabled the event delivery pathway used to notify the automation platform of changes in Jira. The incident was identified through customer support tickets and verified through our monitoring; engineering teams were engaged for resolution. Once the root cause was identified, the configuration was corrected and normal automation processing resumed.\n\nFollowing restoration, the delayed events began flowing to the automation platform for processing. This backlog took approximately 14 hours to fully clear. During this recovery window, some automation rules ran on Work Items whose data had changed due to user actions, customer mitigation, or other causes. Since rule execution usually follows triggering events closely, many customer rules assume immediate execution on the Work Item. The delay allowed other changes \u2014such as updates or customer actions to mitigate the incident's impact \u2014 to occur, causing unintended consequences when the rule executed later.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the impact window, Jira Cloud customers were unable to rely on timely execution of event\u2011triggered automation rules. Rules that depended on Jira Work Item events - including Work Item created, Work Item updated, comment added, sprint changes, and version changes - ran with significant delays. This affected automated workflows responsible for Work Item routing, notifications, field updates, and other rule\u2011driven actions throughout the outage. Automation rules that used scheduled, manual, or incoming webhook triggers remained unaffected.\n\nFollowing mitigation, a recovery period of approximately 14 hours was required to process the backlog of delayed events. During this window, processing delays peaked at approximately 12 hours from event occurrence to rule completion. In some cases, rules executing against Work Item data several hours after the rule trigger occurred, caused problems due to the rules being built with the expectation in mind that little time would pass between trigger and execution. This resulted in Work Items ending up in an unintended state; especially as some customers undertook manual intervention given the situation.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe incident was caused by a configuration change to an internal feature flag used to control event delivery to the automation platform.\n\nA code change had been prepared to remove a feature flag from the event delivery system. However, this code change had not yet been deployed to production. When the feature flag was subsequently retired through our feature flag management system, the retirement process relied on usage telemetry that incorrectly indicated the flag was no longer active. This inadvertently created a blind spot where the flag appeared unused when it was in fact being actively evaluated.\n\nWhen the flag was retired, the event delivery system interpreted its absence as an instruction to stop delivering Jira events to the automation platform, causing all event-triggered automation rules to stop firing.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe understand that outages impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritising the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future:\n\n* **Strengthen feature flag lifecycle safety controls**\n\n    * Address the telemetry gap by removing feature flagged code from the hot path of our event processing framework where it was being surpressed, ensuring we have good telemetry on feature flag use across our systems. This will prevent inadvertent archival of feature flags in future.\n    * Refine feature flag retirement processes so that flags cannot be retired without verifying actual production usage, independent of standard telemetry signals.\n    \n* **Improve event delivery monitoring and alerting**\n\n    * Refine monitoring to detect drops in automation event delivery rates within minutes, and add automated alerting on automation execution volume anomalies to enable faster detection of disruptions.\n    \n* **Improve our ability to clear delayed events faster and deliver controls for customers to decide alternative workflows for events based on delay.**\n\n    * Refine replay infrastructure to recover faster from the pent up backlog that can be created due to delays.\n    * Provide workflow components that allow users to decide what to do for varying delays between the triggering event and when the rule gets executed to reduce the risk of unintended changes during recovery.\n    \n\nWe recognise the importance of Jira Automation to our customers' workflows and are committed to ongoing improvements to the reliability and resilience of our platform. We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused, and we will continue to invest in measures that support a stable and dependable service.\n\nThanks,  \nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-03-19T04:08:07.930Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-03-18T11:32:44.090Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Automations aren't triggering on work item creation, field updates, or comment additions",
"updated_at": "2026-04-02T07:09:17.024Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/9f7zz880mxgg"
},
{
"body": "On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-03-10T00:59:02.610Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-03-10T00:06:29.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Automation events delayed for some customers in the APAC region",
"updated_at": "2026-03-10T00:59:02.626Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/vtjd18709cp6"
},
{
"body": "On February 26, 2026, JSM experienced a disruption, and Atlassian Assist service was unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-26T18:55:34.268Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-26T13:22:27.919Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Atlassian Assist in Jira Service Management is currently unavailable.",
"updated_at": "2026-02-26T18:55:34.287Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/dbcv0rtg0xmj"
},
{
"body": "This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-20T12:26:08.654Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-20T02:52:52.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Cloud Products when selecting users or teams",
"updated_at": "2026-02-20T12:26:08.675Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/fh4lzptcmzbj"
},
{
"body": "On February 6, 2026, JIRA and JSM experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-07T05:38:02.296Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-06T20:24:43.020Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted JIRA and JSM availability",
"updated_at": "2026-02-07T05:38:02.313Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/y8123whlvnvl"
},
{
"body": "The team has verified that the fix has successfully propagated to all accounts. Impacted customers will receive an email follow-up containing additional information.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-06T20:01:36.336Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-06T01:47:12.947Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Users incorrectly moved from Free to Standard Service Collection Trial account",
"updated_at": "2026-02-06T20:01:36.351Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/qv560mhqq7mf"
},
{
"body": "On February 5, 2026, JIRA and JIRA Service Management experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-02-05T21:38:38.936Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-02-05T14:13:19.244Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Some users in us-east-1 region unable to access Jira and JSM.",
"updated_at": "2026-02-05T21:38:38.953Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/xtnt42wdq8b8"
},
{
"body": "On Jan 28, 2026, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, and Jira Service Management users in eu-west-1 region may have experienced delays in viewing recently submitted updates on the web page and/or mobile apps. Updates continued to process successfully during the incident.\u00a0 There are no actions needed from customers.\u00a0 The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-28T19:42:33.687Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-28T18:12:17.420Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Jira, JPD, and JSM in eu-west-1",
"updated_at": "2026-01-28T19:42:33.705Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/zvc22ygqnwnl"
},
{
"body": "Deployment of the fix is completed and services are back to normal.\nThis issue is resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-27T11:49:55.761Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-27T11:07:43.490Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Assets intermittently unavailable",
"updated_at": "2026-01-27T11:49:55.777Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/m0j525yzhb0r"
},
{
"body": "On January 22, 2026, affected Jira Service Management users may have experienced some service disruption where assets were not loading, affecting their interactions with service management functionality.\n\nThe issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-22T16:47:08.156Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-22T14:44:52.376Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "JSM Asset not loading",
"updated_at": "2026-01-23T01:13:27.569Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/8yff2r7rvs1r"
},
{
"body": "On January 20, 2026, some customers may have experienced performance degradation of Assets. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-20T23:09:39.036Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-20T19:10:42.336Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Issue affecting Assets",
"updated_at": "2026-01-20T23:09:39.049Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/1zr2bqx6m7wv"
},
{
"body": "Rerunning the remaining Automation for Jira rules that failed for affected customers is complete.\nThis update resolves the issue.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2026-01-07T11:32:20.593Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2026-01-06T05:18:20.492Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Disrupted Automation for Jira triggers not running for some customers",
"updated_at": "2026-01-07T11:32:20.611Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/fjnhjc36fhlk"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available.\n\nThe issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian\u2019s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions.\n\nAll impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began.\n\n### IMPACT\n\nDuring the impact window, customers experienced:\n\n* **Outbound product email failures** \\(notifications and other product emails did not send\\).\n* **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \\(e.g. sign\u2011ups, password resets, one\u2011time\u2011password / step\u2011up challenges\\).\n* **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications**\n* **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing.\n\n### ROOT CAUSE\n\nThe incident was caused by:\n\n1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal.\n2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully.\n\n### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS\n\nWe recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers\u2019 ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites.\n\nWe are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes:\n\n* **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure**\n\n    * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry.\n    * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline.\n    \n* **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows**  \n  We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations.\n\nWe apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided.\n\nThanks,  \nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "critical",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-27T05:20:21.660Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-27T02:48:18.569Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Outbound Email, Mobile Push Notifications, and Support Ticket Delivery Impacting All Cloud Products",
"updated_at": "2026-01-30T04:07:57.334Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/6p90tmt9zkd8"
},
{
"body": "On December 15th, 2025, Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Ecosystem, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, and Rovo users in the prod-us-east region may have experienced performance degradations and errors on the web page and mobile apps. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-15T19:02:04.458Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-15T16:16:26.419Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, and Rovo",
"updated_at": "2025-12-15T19:02:04.485Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/1pcr5xjh150l"
},
{
"body": "On December 5th, 2025, Jira Service Management users may have experienced an error when creating linked work items that included an attachment. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-05T15:32:39.152Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-05T13:16:10.986Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Linked worked item functionality is broken, if the work item contains an attachment.",
"updated_at": "2025-12-05T15:32:39.169Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/lrfb8s8pk6v2"
},
{
"body": "Impact\n\nJira Software users experienced degraded performance affecting their ability to view issues and boards. Users may have encountered an error or slowdown during this time.\n\nCurrent Status\n\nThe situation is currently mitigated due to actions taken on the affected systems, leading to a stabilization of services. \n\nNext Steps\n\nThe team is actively monitoring the systems.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-12-01T18:26:46.066Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-12-01T17:25:53.211Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded Performance for Some Jira Users",
"updated_at": "2025-12-01T18:26:46.083Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/jrb6zzr234df"
},
{
"body": "### Summary\n\nOn November 21, 2025, between 13:44 and 15:16 UTC, Trello customers were intermittently unable to view and update data on their boards. Customers also may have experienced issues authenticating with Atlassian products, and creating new GitHub and Slack integrations.\n\nThe event was triggered by a bug encountered in the software running our edge proxy fleet, which proxies customer traffic to Atlassian cloud services. The changes included the migration of our edge proxy fleet to hosts running an ARM CPU architecture, rather than the AMD64 CPU architecture they had previously been running, which impacted US East customers.\n\nThe incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by a scale up of of fleet size, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. This was followed by a global migration of edge proxy fleet hosts back to AMD64 CPU architecture the following day.\n\n### **IMPACT**\n\nDuring the impact window, US East customers intermittently could not view or update data in Trello.\n\nThe same underlying issue also impacted our Identity services and integrations with GitHub and Slack, meaning some customers had trouble signing in to Atlassian products or creating new integrations. At the incident\u2019s peak, the incident impacted up to:\n\n* 52% of new Trello network connections.\n* 9% of new GitHub and Slack integrations.\n* 8% of new Identity network connections.\n\n### **ROOT CAUSE**\n\nThe issue was caused by a change to CPU architecture from AMD64 to ARM on our edge proxy fleet. This led to a bug that caused these instances to stall under high load, and refuse up to 52% of new connections. As a result, some customers of the products above could not make new connections to Atlassian services, and customers received CloudFront 504 gateway timeout error responses.\n\n### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS**\n\nWe know that outages impact your productivity. While we deploy our changes progressively by cloud region to avoid broad impact, on this occasion, our pre-change load testing had not accurately reflected production loads.\n\nAs part of our response to this incident, and to help prevent recurrence, we rolled back all edge proxy fleets from ARM to AMD64 CPU architecture globally.\n\nTo minimise the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we plan to implement additional preventative measures such as:\n\n* Adding improved load tests into edge proxy fleet deployment pipelines to catch load-related bugs before deployment to production.\n* Adding alerts to our edge proxy fleet to catch rises in TCP connect times before customer impact.\n\nWe apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking steps to help improve the platform\u2019s performance and availability.\n\nThanks,\n\nAtlassian Customer Support",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-21T16:49:35.107Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-21T14:55:09.132Z",
"state": "postmortem",
"title": "Multiple Atlassian services experiencing degraded performance",
"updated_at": "2025-12-08T05:24:14.220Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/d9y1lc2qh00x"
},
{
"body": "On November 18, 2025, some Jira Service Management users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-18T17:29:29.805Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-18T14:43:48.207Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Customers are receiving message NO SUCH TRACK intermittently when opening Jira issues",
"updated_at": "2025-11-18T17:29:29.829Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/y97ww69p5xxf"
},
{
"body": "The issue has been resolved. All systems are healthy and fully operational, with no further problems observed in sending emails from Jira.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-17T11:50:17.349Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-15T16:29:43.934Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Some users are unable to send emails from Jira",
"updated_at": "2025-11-17T11:50:17.369Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/mz20s2kznd56"
},
{
"body": "On November 3, 2025, some Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Jira Cloud users may have experienced performance degradation and errors in the Global Automation UI page. Automation executions were not impacted by this incident. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-11-03T18:08:57.473Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-11-03T16:11:55.000Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance and intermittent errors",
"updated_at": "2025-11-03T18:08:57.491Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/kqgbngd4667g"
},
{
"body": "Confirmed that the incident has been resolved and the automation rules are executing as expected.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-16T12:28:20Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-31T04:26:28.265Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-31T02:12:06.272Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Automation rule conditions order change is affecting customers",
"updated_at": "2025-10-31T04:26:28.282Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/7d5503krfnns"
},
{
"body": "Incident has been resolved.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "minor",
"last_seen": "2026-09-14T12:29:13Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-30T02:09:45.000Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-29T06:47:03.186Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Degraded performance of Atlassian cloud sites for some customers",
"updated_at": "2025-10-30T02:11:47.886Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/hl1pl3v593zc"
},
{
"body": "Between 15:09 UTC to 17:16 UTC, some customers experienced partial outage for Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, and Jira viewIssue, createIssue and editIssue caused by a faulty code rollout.  We have deployed a fix to mitigate the issue and have verified that the services have recovered.  The root cause is still being investigated and will be provided in the post incident review. The conditions that cause the errors are being addressed and we're actively working on a permanent fix. The issue has been resolved and the services are operating normally.",
"first_seen": "2026-09-04T07:06:16Z",
"impact": "major",
"last_seen": "2026-09-10T12:15:40Z",
"resolved_at": "2025-10-27T17:50:17.791Z",
"resolved_inferred": false,
"started_at": "2025-10-27T16:33:50.757Z",
"state": "resolved",
"title": "Jira Platform Incident - viewIssue and createIssue Service Disruption",
"updated_at": "2025-10-27T17:50:17.812Z",
"url": "https://stspg.io/cqn581jzhjb2"
}
]
}