https://approjects-vendor-status-watch.static.hf.space/v/squiz.htmlIncidents from Squiz's public status page, polled daily.Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:28:20 +0000https://stspg.io/xddrb4ypjqm3squiz:2026-09-10T21:26:46.306+10:00Thu, 10 Sep 2026 11:26:46 +0000This incident has been resolved. Information pertaining to this incident will be available via this status page in the near future.https://stspg.io/b12snnzhnpytsquiz:2026-09-10T11:58:36.405+10:00Thu, 10 Sep 2026 01:58:36 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/ysdff8mbxjnjsquiz:2026-06-16T22:50:46.334+10:00Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:50:46 +0000**Summary** A spike in crawling traffic originating from Facebook \(Meta\) targeted search pages, caused excessive load on the **DXP search infrastructure**. Initial mitigation involved blocking the crawler at the individual account level. Upon identifying that the traffic was dynamically shifting across multiple accounts over time, a **global rule** was implemented to block the traffic across all search instances, successfully stabilizing the platform. **Customer Impact** A subset of **UK-based clients** experienced intermittent intermittent timeout / HTTP 500 errors when attempting to access their infrastructure during the period of elevated load. **Root Cause** The issue was caused by elevated crawling activity originating from Facebook infrastructure that targeted specific searhttps://stspg.io/t7bs856274zzsquiz:2026-06-16T19:56:15.878+10:00Tue, 16 Jun 2026 09:56:15 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/7fmr8b43vzyjsquiz:2026-04-16T08:57:30.153+10:00Wed, 15 Apr 2026 22:57:30 +0000Squiz teams have worked with our 3rd party service provider, and all data impacted by the integration delay has been restored. This incident has been resolved, and all systems impacted are working as expected.https://stspg.io/lvst5drzzlbxsquiz:2026-03-13T10:50:00.676+11:00Thu, 12 Mar 2026 23:50:00 +0000The incident has been resolved and Advanced Forms access should be restored for all customers.https://stspg.io/wr1pv54bqzmysquiz:2026-03-05T02:52:07.286+11:00Wed, 04 Mar 2026 15:52:07 +0000Squiz teams have worked with our 3rd party service provider, and a fix has been deployed for the current Incident. This restored service for all affected customers. We apologise for this degradation of service and thank you for your patience while we worked on the resolution. A postmortem will be provided via https://status.squiz.cloud once we have worked with our service provider.https://stspg.io/wtcjtdzftj23squiz:2026-02-21T05:09:32.050+11:00Fri, 20 Feb 2026 18:09:32 +0000**Executive Summary** On Friday, February 20, 2026, at 1748 UTC, a global Cloudflare incident impacted network routing used to deliver traffic to services hosted on the Squiz DXP platform. During this time: * All DXP users, and Squiz cloud customers using Cloudflare, were unable to log in to any administrative interfaces in the Squiz DXP, including the Console, Content Management System \(Matrix\), and Funnelback. * Customer frontend websites using Cloudflare were returning cloudflare errors “Connection timed Out” This issue was caused by a change that Cloudflare made to how our network manages IP addresses. Cloudflare have provided a detailed analysis of the incident at [https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-outage-february-20-2026/](https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-outage-febrhttps://stspg.io/fxkfkzfgwh38squiz:2026-01-23T11:59:23.000+11:00Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:59:23 +0000## Incident Summary A problem on a 3rd party Network impacted the Internet connectivity between two different service providers that Squiz utilise for Internet transit and CDN for some customers hosted within our Australian Data Centres. Squiz DXP services were unaffected The service degradation began on **Jan 23, 11:56 AEDT**, and ended **Jan 24, 10:22 AEDT** when the 3rd party Network operator fixed their network. Squiz continued to monitor for any further impact for an extended length of time, and the incident was officially resolved **Jan 24, 23:26 AEDT,** once we received confirmation from our service provider as to the root cause. ‌ ## Incident Timeline This is a high-level summary of the key events during the incident. All times are in AEDT. | **Time** | **Event** | | --- | -https://stspg.io/jnxpypkg8ggwsquiz:2025-12-05T20:17:14.289+11:00Fri, 05 Dec 2025 09:17:14 +0000Cloudflare has confirmed that the issue is resolved, and we are also declaring it resolved on our end. For further details, please refer back to this page.https://stspg.io/kszzllrk09lxsquiz:2025-11-21T09:35:32.314+11:00Thu, 20 Nov 2025 22:35:32 +0000We have completed our investigation into the reported access and permissions issues affecting the Funnelback Admin console on POD01 (Australia). Our engineering team has performed comprehensive checks on the authentication infrastructure. We have confirmed that Single Sign-On (SSO) services and DXP User Role assignments are functioning as intended. No platform-wide remediation was required. All users with the correct role assignments (DXP Developer, Site Admin, and above) can access the console as normal.https://stspg.io/whgxjjpm0h6fsquiz:2025-11-18T23:13:47.507+11:00Tue, 18 Nov 2025 12:13:47 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/f2cxwz63km4vsquiz:2025-10-26T12:16:50.000+11:00Sun, 26 Oct 2025 01:16:50 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/74lckvkjk3dtsquiz:2025-10-20T18:29:17.965+11:00Mon, 20 Oct 2025 07:29:17 +0000We have received confirmation from AWS that the incident shall now be resolved. We will continue to monitor for changes and will communicate if a further issue arises. Feel free to let us know at My.Squiz.Net if you believe you are still affected.https://stspg.io/fqyrdrj42fr0squiz:2025-10-20T16:20:24.963+11:00Mon, 20 Oct 2025 05:20:24 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/q8q7qjq2p9h5squiz:2025-10-17T19:49:56.565+11:00Fri, 17 Oct 2025 08:49:56 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/51txj12vtpjxsquiz:2025-10-16T02:38:38.455+11:00Wed, 15 Oct 2025 15:38:38 +0000This incident has been resolvedhttps://stspg.io/y4wfwgj8nh9tsquiz:2025-09-11T02:25:58.854+10:00Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:25:58 +0000This incident is resolved.