https://approjects-vendor-status-watch.static.hf.space/v/teraswitch.htmlIncidents from TeraSwitch's public status page, polled daily.Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:28:20 +0000https://stspg.io/blc9h3xcyb5kteraswitch:2026-09-04T13:09:58.363ZFri, 04 Sep 2026 13:09:58 +0000All links have been restored and are stable. Traffic is fully normalized.https://stspg.io/7q02723fqk1zteraswitch:2026-09-03T14:52:14.705ZThu, 03 Sep 2026 14:52:14 +0000AWS has restored normal operation in the TYO market.https://stspg.io/2913538rjj9steraswitch:2026-08-22T02:45:31.045ZSat, 22 Aug 2026 02:45:31 +0000The connection between NY and Chicago has been repaired and has remained stable for multiple hours.https://stspg.io/1rmc0tlrld0bteraswitch:2026-08-12T05:18:53.835ZWed, 12 Aug 2026 05:18:53 +0000_\(A more detailed/illustrated RCA in PDF format is available on request\)_ # Internet Outage Event at Multiple Sites **Incident date:** August 12, 2026  ·  **Regions affected:** EU, APAC  ·  **Full recovery:** 33 minutes ## Executive summary In the early morning of August 12, 2026 \(UTC\), customers at thirteen of Teraswitch's 31 sites lost reachability to Internet destinations and to other Teraswitch sites over the private backbone: twelve across the EU and APAC regions, and MIA1 in North America, which was intentionally and temporarily removed from the backbone as a containment measure. The cause was a stale default route \(`0.0.0.0/0`\) originated by an MIA1 edge router: a static route left over from the site's turn-up, redistributed into BGP. The static is deliberately less preferhttps://stspg.io/jwwsk07b22zzteraswitch:2026-07-29T19:15:40.868ZWed, 29 Jul 2026 19:15:40 +0000Teraswitch has completed remediations to remove the bug-triggering configurations from our routers, as well as upgrading our route reflectors and adding diverse vendors on routing software. These stabilizations have proven reliable since July 30th, when we have not seen any additonal invalid packets (IS-IS LSA advertisements) inside our backbone. We expect no further impacts from this issue.https://stspg.io/mjnqq334ss3rteraswitch:2026-07-28T16:17:12.719ZTue, 28 Jul 2026 16:17:12 +0000A possible firmware/hardware bug was identified, and Teraswitch NOC elected to do a sequential software upgrade on the redundant switch pair in R102. After the reloads were complete, operations seemed to normalized. We will investigate this network switch pair further to understand the event better. Please report any outstanding issues with TYO2 to noc@teraswitch.com or to our team directly.https://stspg.io/5z1vg2xwgxvhteraswitch:2026-07-17T23:45:37.835ZFri, 17 Jul 2026 23:45:37 +0000Our facility partner has restored power to Teraswitch's SGP2 network racks. Root cause: both redundant PDUs in each network rack were fed by power breakout boxes connected to the same overhead electrical bus bar, creating a single point of failure. Facility engineers relocated one breakout box to the correct bus, restoring power to the network equipment and eliminating the single point of failure. We expect no further impact at this time. Customer systems did not lose power at any point during this event.https://stspg.io/h5nypgf38l9rteraswitch:2026-07-08T17:48:45.507ZWed, 08 Jul 2026 17:48:45 +0000Teraswitch monitoring reports that all impacts are currently resolved. Please report any further issues to our team. At EWR2, a device sitting between our data center fabric and our internet edge routers experienced a hardware fault that triggered an ASIC-level reload. After the reload, the device came back online in a degraded state and was unable to forward traffic from the data center fabric to the internet edge routers (specifically, it could not process VXLAN-routed traffic). EWR2 operates six of these core routers. Five were unaffected; however, the impaired unit failed to signal that it was incapable of forwarding traffic. Because downstream routing protocols did not detect this bad state, traffic that landed on the affected device was blackholed. Our team manually removed the rohttps://stspg.io/c1g2q0y75l68teraswitch:2026-06-10T00:24:56.019ZWed, 10 Jun 2026 00:24:56 +0000The Concerto cable was fully restored - multiple redundant links are now back online.https://stspg.io/f486k8tttvpbteraswitch:2026-06-04T15:27:37.854ZThu, 04 Jun 2026 15:27:37 +0000Tokyo to Seattle has been nominal operation for many hours now. We are working with our vendors to understand the issue, but at this time we consider the incident and impact resolved.https://stspg.io/pgwmg9vtzhzpteraswitch:2026-05-12T21:18:03.264ZTue, 12 May 2026 21:18:03 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/kqhs7qfkzbw2teraswitch:2026-05-07T02:03:18.963ZThu, 07 May 2026 02:03:18 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/gq1cw26rxxsrteraswitch:2026-04-30T23:33:00.510ZThu, 30 Apr 2026 23:33:00 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/w5r5d85ryn3mteraswitch:2026-03-26T22:08:43.581ZThu, 26 Mar 2026 22:08:43 +0000# Root Cause Analysis: AMS1 Connectivity Outage **Incident Date:** March 26, 2025 **Duration:** ~1h 21m \(22:08 UTC – 00:14 UTC \+1\) **Severity:** Critical – Full site connectivity loss **Affected Site:** AMS1 – Amsterdam, Netherlands **Status:** Resolved ## Executive Summary On March 26, 2025, Teraswitch's AMS1 facility experienced a complete loss of backbone connectivity lasting approximately 1 hour and 21 minutes. The outage was caused by a scheduled fiber vendor maintenance window that simultaneously impacted both the primary and what was believed to be a diverse redundant fiber path between AMS1 and the rest of the backbone. Investigation revealed that due to a documentation and handoff error at the fiber vendor dating back over a year, the AMS1–AMS2 fiber span had never been migrhttps://stspg.io/24zh1n01w7myteraswitch:2026-03-19T21:43:43.000ZThu, 19 Mar 2026 21:43:43 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/6ct1khtkhm12teraswitch:2026-03-17T20:05:09.047ZTue, 17 Mar 2026 20:05:09 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/9njyx1jvk9ckteraswitch:2026-02-20T07:47:15.436ZFri, 20 Feb 2026 07:47:15 +0000Cogent has recovered as of 4:33am Eastern. Services should be normalized at this time.https://stspg.io/7pv903mcl15tteraswitch:2026-02-20T07:01:09.407ZFri, 20 Feb 2026 07:01:09 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/ypljm16m7tcqteraswitch:2026-02-19T02:08:01.426ZThu, 19 Feb 2026 02:08:01 +0000We have successfully brought online a second diverse sub-sea cable path and latency has returned to normal. Once the original severed cable comes back online, we will now have full path redundancy.https://stspg.io/7kdbbsz7xz98teraswitch:2026-02-04T10:45:55.000ZWed, 04 Feb 2026 10:45:55 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/6f0gg7pnq1s3teraswitch:2026-02-03T19:54:44.362ZTue, 03 Feb 2026 19:54:44 +0000Cloudflare has resolved the issue, and console.tsw.io is accessible once again as of 22:28 UTC. This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/jfc4hn87y9mnteraswitch:2026-01-30T09:53:25.098ZFri, 30 Jan 2026 09:53:25 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/fb748gs1wxtqteraswitch:2026-01-28T14:17:19.327ZWed, 28 Jan 2026 14:17:19 +0000At 2PM UTC, Teraswitch reloaded software related to our route servers to fix "stuck" transport tunneling sessions. This may have caused interruptions to ULL/HFT and transport services over our network. We believe the first stuck session started approximately 6 hours before, with more dropping off over the next few hours. As of this moment, all stuck sessions appear to be resolved, and traffic is passing normally and via ULL links.https://stspg.io/fmq26pds5bg4teraswitch:2025-12-28T02:19:14.019ZSun, 28 Dec 2025 02:19:14 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/ccc5bmh6hk65teraswitch:2025-12-05T21:53:33.000ZFri, 05 Dec 2025 21:53:33 +0000The cause of the increased errors was identified and fixes put in place. This issue is resolved.https://stspg.io/gd6z69yw6bhvteraswitch:2025-11-29T05:21:58.947ZSat, 29 Nov 2025 05:21:58 +0000Fault has cleared and cable returned to service.https://stspg.io/p6rgrsl2g0zkteraswitch:2025-11-18T12:08:44.233ZTue, 18 Nov 2025 12:08:44 +0000Cloudflare updated their incident report that their services are now operating normally - they will post a final update to the incident once their investigation has concluded. Teraswitch monitoring confirms our console / API services have stabilized with no further errors. This incident is now resolved.https://stspg.io/bs1glxq85nkcteraswitch:2025-11-14T15:17:21.870ZFri, 14 Nov 2025 15:17:21 +0000This incident is now considered resolved.https://stspg.io/r3864x53553kteraswitch:2025-10-29T16:13:07.000ZWed, 29 Oct 2025 16:13:07 +0000This incident has been resolved.https://stspg.io/s99b33qd8pr4teraswitch:2025-10-29T00:20:29.380ZWed, 29 Oct 2025 00:20:29 +0000This detour has already cleared and was a momentary disruption. TeraSwitch will engage our transport vendor for a better understanding of this incident.